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Introduction 
 
 Democracy has become one of the most heavily debated ideas in political 
science. Indeed, it has made the evolution from mere procedural idea to becoming 
synonymous with individual freedom itself. So much so that Nobel Laureate Amartya 
Sen has been able to declare democracy an almost universal value, stating: “While 
democracy is not yet universally practiced, nor indeed universally accepted, in the 
general climate of world opinion, democratic governance has now achieved the status 
of being taken to be generally right.”1 In the expanse of democratization literature, 
Sub-Saharan Africa has occupied a troubling space. Possessing some of the world’s 
worst poverty, while also having some of the worlds most resource rich nations; 
Africa is truly a continent of contradiction and one were stable governance is in dire 
need but in short supply. 
  The prognosis for democracy on the continent has been, historically extremely 
negative. When applying Freedom House’s measures, which involve analyzing 
countries according to the political rights and civil liberties, they afford their citizenry. 
A score between 1 and 7 is assigned to each variable, with 1 indicating complete 
freedom and 7 none. The scores are combined to then assign a designation; Free 
indicates a Liberal Democracy; Partly Free an Electoral Democracy; Not Free an 
autocracy. As we can see from table 1.1, made using the latest Freedom House report, 
of the 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa only 9 are considered free, with the rest 
either autocratic or in a state of ambiguity. Furthermore, adding to the continents poor 
                                                        
1
 Amartya Kumar Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value," Journal of Democracy 10, no. 3 
(1999) 
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political prognosis over half of the Sub-Saharan countries have been involved in 
ethnic wars since 1980 making Africa a continent sorely lacking in both accountability 
and stability.2  
 
Table 1 Sub-Saharan Africa Freedom House Designations 
Designation Countries 
Free Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome & 
Principe, South Africa 
Partly Free Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Guinea-Bissau Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia 
Not Free Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe 
Source: Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2010 
 
The consequences of all this strife have been economic stagnation, abused 
human rights and rampant poverty. There has been much debate on the advantages and 
disadvantages of democracy in regards to its ability to efficiently handle 
development3; however, questions on the affects of democratic regime are beyond the 
scope of this paper. This paper advances on the notion that accountable and 
representative government is preferable to other systems, especially when it comes to 
distributing social benefits.4 Although democracies have a mixed bag in terms of 
achieving development goals, it is obvious they are more attentive to the needs of their 
constituents as it is from them that their power is derived. In addition, leadership 
                                                        
2
 P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, "On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002) 
3
 S Przeworski, Adam, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi. Democracy and Development: 
Political Institutions and Well Being in the World 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
4
 Jackman, Robert. "Political Democracy and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis." 
American Sociological Association 39 (February 1974).  
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succession has been a large issue in Sub-Saharan Africa as evidenced by table 2, 
which shows how leaders have left office on the continent from 1960 until 2004. 
 
Table 2. How Leaders have left office in Sub-Saharan Africa 1960-2004 
Reason for leaving 
office 
1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-04 Total 
Overthrown in coup, 
war or invasion 
27 30 22 22 4 105 
(51.4%) 
Assassination (not 
part of coup) 
1 1 1 2 1 6 
(2.9%) 
Died of natural causes 2 3 4 3 0 12 
(5.8%) 
Retired Voluntarily 1 2 5 9 8 25 
(12.2%) 
Lost election and left 
office 
0 0 1 12 3 16 
(7.8%) 
Other (interim regime 
or impeachment) 
6 8 4 14 8 40 
(19.6%) 
All regime transitions 37 44 37 62 24 204 
Source: Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics (pg. 2)  
 
As one can see, of the 204 cases of leadership change only 20% were by 
consent those through voluntary retirement and election loss. The vast majority, 
however, have been through the result of involuntary and often violent measures, 
which have fostered instability. In fact, over half of the leadership changes on the 
continent have been due to a coup, war or invasion. It is easy to envisage that with 
functioning democracies in place leadership succession would not be as murky on the 
continent leading to more stability. However, there are still positives that can be drawn 
from the table and one notes an increase in voluntary office departure through the 
years, which is a positive indicator for democracy. Indeed O’Donnell and Schmitter 
have highlighted consensual leadership alternation as a sign of political development 
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and democratic consolidation.5 In addition, there is also a sharp decrease in the 
number of over throw cases showing that, although extremely limited, there has been 
democratic progress on the continent. Thus, in this vein this paper will draw from all 
sides of the Sub-Saharan democratization experience, the Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 
in order to find ways to aid its continual development.  
To achieve this end, I intend to do a comparative study analyzing the 
democratic transitions of three African countries that have had divergent democratic 
paths; one of success, one of stagnation and one of failure. Consequently, one will 
examine the cases of Ghana, Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
Each country has had a history of neopatrimonial rule with a long-standing dictator; 
Jerry Rawlings in Ghana, Daniel Arap Moi in Kenya, and Mobutu Sese Soku in DRC. 
As introduced by Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, a neopatrimonial regime 
is defined by: “the award by public officials of personal favors, both within the state 
(notably public sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licenses, contracts, and 
projects). In return for material rewards, clients mobilize political support and refer all 
decisions upward as a mark of deference to patrons.”6 This regime characteristic is 
notable in that neopatrimonial regimes are marked by the reluctance of the leader to 
relinquish power. This reluctance manifests in the exclusion of all opposition and 
essentially leaves a system, which in a modification of Robin Theobold’s 
proclamation is the private instrument of those, connected enough to be in power.7 
                                                        
5
 O'Donnell, Guillermo A., Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.  
 
6
 Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas Van De Walle. "Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political 
Transitions in Africa." World Politics 46 (1994). 
7
 Theobold, Robin. “Patrimonialism.” World Politics 34 (1982) 
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Neopatrimonial regimes have been proven to be characteristic of Sub-Saharan African 
regimes and have had notoriously few democratic transitions.8  Thus given this 
common regime background and its noted rigidity, that Ghana, Kenya and the DRC 
are at different stages of democratization is significant and illuminating. Table 3 based 
on the latest freedom house scores reveals the differences. 
 
 Table 3. Ghana, Kenya, DRC Freedom House Designation 
Country Designation Political 
Rights 
Civil 
Liberties 
Press 
Freedom 
Ghana Free 1 2  
Kenya  Partly Free 4 4  
DRC Not Free 6 6  
Source: Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2010, ICRG Risk Ratings Guide 
 
Ghana has a designation of Free meaning it is a Liberal Democracy evidenced by its 
excellent Political Rights and Civil liberties score. Furthermore, Ghana remains the 
only Sub-Saharan country to experience more than one peaceful change of power 
between rival political parties, an achievement integral in democratic consolidation.9 
Neopatrimonial regimes are extremely resistant to democracy; so finding how and 
what allowed Ghana to achieve this change is significant. Kenya was once one of the 
countries viewed with large-scale enthusiasm in regards to democratic progress. 
However, after recent false dawns stagnation has resulted with democratic 
development suspended leading to a Partly Free designation. As most Sub-Saharan 
countries also inhabit this unclear space, the Kenyan prognosis could provide rich 
comparative analysis. The DRC is a noted case of state failure with a past conflict 
                                                        
8
 Ndulu, Benno, and Stephen O'Connell. "Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa." 
American Economic Association 13 (1999).  
 
9
 Barbara Geddes, "By Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan: Problems of Democratic Transition 
and Consolidation: Southern Europe. South America, and Post‐Communist Europe," American 
Journal of Sociology 103, no. 2 (1997) 
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within its borders that was responsible for nearly 1000 deaths a day10 rampant poverty 
and human rights abuses. In possession of large mineral resources the country has 
been constantly stymied by conflict over their control. Despite this, the country has 
recently begun a transition into democracy. This is not something that can be said for 
Africa’s worst rated autocracies, hence, analyzing the DRC allows one to scrutinize a 
country representative of Africa’s most serious issues but which has still achieved 
some progress.  
In order to understand how each of these countries arrived at their particular 
stage of democratic development one intends to analyze their transitions into 
democracy, using the structured contingent approach proposed by Terry Lynn Karl. 
This approach differs from the actor-centric method of analyzing transitions proposed 
by Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillipe Schmitter by also taking into account past 
institutions. O’Donnell and Schmitter contend that transitions are defined by 
uncertainty and that in such a situation past institutions become insignificant.11 
However, as Karl contends “Even in the midst of the tremendous uncertainty provoked 
by a regime transition, where constraints appear to be most relaxed and where a wide 
range of outcomes appears to be possible, the decisions made by various actors 
respond to and are conditioned by the types of socioeconomic structures and political 
institutions already present. These can be decisive in that they may either restrict or 
enhance the options available to different political actors attempting to construct 
                                                        
10
 Mark Doyle, "DRC Conflict 'kills 1,000 a Day," BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4080867.stm 
11
 O'Donnell, Guillermo A., Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986 
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democracy.”12 This is evident in Sub-Saharan Africa, where even with democratic 
opening leaders are installed as heads of states designed to run to their personal benefit 
and typically fall foul of the temptation. Examples such as Mwai Kibaki in Kenya 
Joseph Kabila in DRC stand as evidence of leaders who came into power from free 
and fair elections but still maintained past autocratic approaches.  
Thus, the approach of structured contingent approach seems most relevant in 
this analysis. The approach will involve (a) examining how the transition created the 
context for actor interactions to occur, (b) then analyze how the transition helped or 
hindered the survival of democracy, and (c) finally studying the resultant regime.13 
The paper will be divided into three chapters one on each case country, Ghana 
representing the Good, Kenya the bad and DRC the Ugly of Sub-Saharan democracy. 
Each chapter will begin by sketching the political history of the country in question. 
While applying this sketch one will pay particular attention to the variables of: civil-
military relations, ethnic composition and geopolitical environment. These variables 
have been proven by numerous authors to be significant in the possibilities and 
outcomes of democracies.14 By comparing the interaction of these variables one can 
better understand significant issues, which led to their specific trajectories. From there 
the chapter will then proceed to specific conclusions reached in regards to each 
country. With Ghana the author found the gradual nature of the transition ensured 
Ghana’s relatively stable democratic foundation. For Kenya lack of foresight from 
                                                        
12
 Karl, Terry L. “Dilemma of Democratization in Latin America.” Comparative Politics 23 
(1990) 
13
 ibid. 
14
  For civil-military relations see Huntington: The Soldier and the State; the Theory and 
Politics of Civil-military Relations; for ethnic composition see Horowitz: Ethnic Groups in 
Conflict; for geopolitical environment see Starr “Joining political and Geographic 
perspectives: Geopolitics and International Relations.” 
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leaders appeared at moments when there was a “golden liberalizing opportunity” 
identified by O’Donnell and Schmitter as the moment, usually during a period of 
economic growth, when autocrats could liberalize without losing power and in fact 
enhance their legitimacy. 15 Kenyan leadership failed to take these opportunities, 
effectively reversing the possibility for consolidation. For the DRC its combination of 
resource abundance and rampant ethnic cleavages has greatly deteriorated its 
democratic chances. The paper will conclude by using the evidence from the country 
cases to show that democracy is resilient and can grow on the continent; however, its 
largest obstacle is inadequate leadership. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
15
 O'Donnell, Guillermo A., Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986 
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Chapter 1: The Good 
 
Ghana is a country with a rich and varied history, the first nation to achieve 
independence in the Sub-Saharan continent and increasingly looking like the nation 
most likely to achieve full democratic consolidation. Although receiving stiff 
competition from South Africa and Botswana; Ghana can be considered more fully 
consolidated due to its two peaceful and seamless transitions of power between 
competing parties. Party change has not occurred in either South Africa or Botswana 
and until this is achieved question marks will remain over their democracies and 
whether an incumbent party election loss would lead to significant instability.16 Hence, 
Ghana’s current political development is unique in the Sub-Saharan context; however, 
its current democratic trajectory was not always evident. 
Political History 
 
Table 1.1 Ghanaian Presidents 
President Political Party Time in office 
Kwame Nkrumah Convention People’s Party 1957-1966 
Gen. Joseph Ankrah National Liberation Council 1966-1969 
K. A. Busia NLC 1969-1972 
Col. I.K. Acheampong National Redemption Council 1972-1978 
Dr. Hilla Limann People’s National Party 1979-1982 
Lt. J Rawlings National Democratic Council 1982-2000 
John Kufuor New Patriotic Party 2000-2008 
John Atta Mills NDC 2008-Present 
 
 The political history of Ghana is quite uneven with an early political climate 
characterized by frequent regime change and instability. Ghana achieved its 
independence from British rule in 1957, due to the growing phenomenon of gold coast 
nationalism. The movement of Gold Coast nationalism was key in not only securing 
                                                        
16
 Du Toit, Pierre. State Building and Democracy in Southern Africa Botswana, Zimbabwe, 
and South Africa. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995 
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the independence of Ghana from Great Britain but additionally the movement can be 
traced as the foundation of Ghanaian national and political identity itself.17 With 
Kwame Nkrumah as their combative revolutionary leader the gold coast nationalists 
were able to achieve independence.18  
Nkrumah was initially championed as a liberator and philosopher, his 
proclamation “We face neither East nor West; We face forward” became famous 
across the continent. A strong espouser of Pan-Africanism he believed that full social 
and economic freedom from foreign influence would best achieve his goals. However, 
his policies became increasingly restrictive undermining Ghana’s democratic 
founding. This trend culminated in his 1964 ban of all political parties and his self-
installation as president for life. Eventually, amid growing social unrest, he was 
deposed in 1966 by a military junta named the National Liberation Council (NLC). 
 At this stage, Ghana entered a period of instability during which various 
military and civilian regimes alternated between power and incompetence. The first of 
which led by the NLC identified itself as an interim regime and transferred power to 
the Progress Party (PP) headed by K.A. Busiah after they emerged victorious in the 
1969 elections. Busiah and the PP’s tenure in office was brief with a military junta 
named the National Redemption Council (NRC) led by Col. I.K. Acheampong, 
assuming power in 1972. The NRC remained in provisional power for six years; 
during this time they stylized themselves as the Supreme Military Council. The 
                                                        
17
 Kimble, David. A Political History of Ghana; the Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850-
1928. Oxford University Press 81 (1982) 
18
 ibid.  
 14
SMC’s rule was characterized by “misrule and tussles over the future of democracy”19 
with and plans were initiated for elections in 1979. It was at this stage that another 
coup took place, this time led by Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, a pivotal figure in 
Ghana’s political development. The 1979 elections were carried out as planned with 
Dr. Hilla Limann of the People’s National Party (PNP) emerging as President. 
However, a succession of unsuccessful policies led to another coup by Rawlings in 
1982, this time he installed himself as president. 
Throughout the 1980’s Rawlings and his Provisional National Defense Council 
(PNDC) consolidated power. Rawlings was credited with implementing policies 
which allowed for significant economic improvement.20 However, he was also 
criticized for his strong arm tactics and use of repression. The economic success of his 
policies led to an increasingly large majority of people decrying the lack of democracy 
both domestically and abroad, In addition, due to conditionality’s from various 
financial commitments with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, 
external pressure was significant. Under increasing pressure and sensing the “golden 
opportunity to liberalize”21 was at hand, Rawlings initiated constitutional reform and 
started the electoral process. The 1992 elections were significant in their inclusion of 
numerous opposition parties but condemned worldwide for indiscretions on the part of 
the PNDC reincarnated as the National Democratic Council (NDC). The elections, 
                                                        
19
 Cowen, Michael, and Liisa Laakso. Multi-party Elections in Africa. New York: Palgrave, 
2002 
20
 Jeffries, Richard. "Rawlings and the Poitical Economy of Underdevelopment in Ghana." 
Oxford University Press 81 (1982).  
21
 O'Donnell, Guillermo A., Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.  
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which took place in 1996 on the other hand, were internationally acclaimed.22 
Contested under a new constitution and with an independent electoral commission 
Rawlings and the NDC won again this time, however, to significantly less skepticism. 
Stability was maintained during the period as Ghana contested its first back-to-back 
elections. In 2000, Rawlings reluctantly abdicated power due to the two term limits 
specified in the new constitution. The New Patriotic Party led by John Kufuor was 
voted into power and this constituted the first peaceful transition of power between 
rival political parties. This power transfer was repeated again in 2008 when John Atta 
Mills of the NDC was voted into the presidency. These dual party power transfers 
confirm Ghana’s political maturity.23 
Ethnic Composition 
 
 Ghana, in relation to other Sub-Saharan Countries, has a relatively 
homogenous population. With the Akan people accounting for the largest ethnic group 
with 45.3% of the population and the Mole-Dagbon the next largest at 15.2%.24 Ethnic 
homogeneity has been seen as a distinct advantage for democratic apparition, as a 
unified identity is necessary in order to believe in the principles of the governing 
authority.25 Despite this relative homogeneity there has been tension between different 
ethnic groups as a result of historical issues such as divergence of colonial rule’s 
regional impact and unequal socioeconomic treatment post-independence. In February 
                                                        
22
 Cowen, Michael, and Lisa Laakso. Multi-party Elections in Africa. New York: Palgrave, 
2002.  
23
 Barbara Geddes, "By Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan:Problems of Democratic Transition 
and Consolidation: Southern Europe. South America, and Post-Communist Europe," American 
Journal of Sociology 103, no. 2 (1997) 
24
 Ethnic composition data taken from CIA the World Factbook 
25
 M. Steven Fish and Robin S. Brooks, "Does Diversity Hurt Democracy?," Journal of 
Democracy 15, no. 1 (2004) 
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1994 conflict between the Konkomba and the Nunumba, Dagomba and Gonja, 
resulted in more than a1000 deaths.26 This event is noted, however, for its uniqueness 
and Ghana is largely free of ethnic conflict as such is experienced in the DRC and 
Kenya. The tension in Ghana has been likely to manifest politically in passive ways 
such as Akan’s being unlikely to vote for a Ewe politician regardless of mandate and 
vice versa.27  However, unlike the DRC these tensions have not erupted into full-scale 
conflict. In order to ensure that ethnic fractionalization did not occur in the 1992 
election Ghana implemented a no ethnic political parties ban.28 The effects of such 
bans have generally shown that these types of bans actually encourage more ethnic 
strife by creating a rallying point29. These bans may have saved Ghana from the 
domestic instability and circle of retribution that typifies factionalized conflict. 
Geopolitical Environment 
 
Table 1.1 Ghana Geopolitical Environments 
Country FH Designation Ethnic War Revolutionary 
War 
Genocide 
Burkina 
Faso  
Partly Free  No No No 
Ivory Coast Not Free No No No 
Togo Partly Free No No No 
Source: Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2010, ICRG Political Risk Guide  
 
 Another positive variable for Ghana’s democratic development is its 
comparatively stable geopolitical environment. This is evidenced by table 1.1, which 
                                                        
26
 "Ghana: Information on Violence between Members of the Konkomba and Nunumba Ethnic 
Groups in February 1994, Particularly in Adibo Village, and the Governement Attitude to This 
Violence." UNHCR Welcome. 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,463af2212,497481b02,3ae6ac854,0.html. 
27
 Cowen, Michael, and Lisa Laakso. Multi-party Elections in Africa. New York: Palgrave, 
2002 
28
 ibid. 
29
 Basedau, Matthias, and Anika Morof. "Parties in Chains: Do Ethnic Party Bans in Africa 
Promote Peace?" Party Politics, 2011. 
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shows all of Ghana’s neighbors, their Freedom House Designation and whether they 
have had ethnic war, revolutionary war or genocide since their independence. 
Significantly, none of Ghana’s neighbors have had large-scale domestic unrest 
according to data from the ICRG Political Risk Guide.30 Given that geopolitical 
environment and more precisely the peacefulness of said environment is significant in 
the outcome of democracy this is a fortunate situation for Ghana.31 Indeed when 
looking at Ghana’s wider regional environment there is also the presence of Mali and 
Benin two other nations considered Free.32 The stability of Ghana’s neighbors means 
it does not have to be preoccupied with security issues but can instead focus on its 
own domestic political development. 
Civil-Military Relations 
 
Huntington in his work The Soldier and the State perfectly characterized civil-
military relations contending: “Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, 
and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism 
… The military officer must remain neutral politically … The area of military science 
is subordinate to, and yet independent of, the area of politics … The military 
profession exists to serve the state … The superior political wisdom of the statesman 
must be accepted as a fact.”33 Ghana’s experience with military rule has generally lent 
credence to this contention. Each military government that gained power in Ghana was 
vastly incompetent although the civilian governments fared little better. However, the 
first coup that occurred in 1966 set a dangerous precedent for military involvement 
                                                        
30
 "ICRG." The PRS Group. Accessed April 26, 2011. http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg.aspx. 
 
32
 Using Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2010 
33
 Huntington, Samuel P. The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-military 
Relations. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957. 
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within the government. From that initial foray Ghana’s subsequent regimes were 
unable to curb the interference of the army.34 This phenomenon is evidenced in Latin 
American countries such as Brazil where the military after its initial foray into politics 
refused to abdicate its role.35 A turning point occurred during Rawlings’ presidency 
because of his army experience and loyalties he was able to slowly reduce the role of 
the military. This was done in order to insulate him from coup attempts but it also 
served the function of normalizing the civil-military relations.36 This increased 
political security combined with economic growth ensured Rawlings felt confident to 
initiate a transition into multiparty elections and substantively, democracy. 
Transition Dynamics 
 
Applying structured contingent choice to the transition in 1992 towards 
multiparty elections shows the benefits of Ghana’s mode of transition. First all the 
transition was completely incumbent led more so than any Latin America pacted 
transition with the possible exception of Brazil’s gradual transition.37 The fact that the 
transition was completely elite led gives this transition the designation of a 
transformation. These transitions are noted for their stability and this transition 
dynamic allowed for political cleavages and not ethnic cleavages to guide the 
transition. However, these transitions also left the presence of authoritarian enclaves.38 
These enclaves block democratic development and in some ways Rawlings system of 
                                                        
34
 Hutchful, Eboe. "Military Policy and Reform in Ghana." The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 1997. 
35
 Hagopian, F. "Democracy by Undemocratic Means?": Elites, Political Pacts, and Regime 
Transition in Brazil." Comparative Political Studies 23, no. 2 (1990). 
36 Jeffries, Richard. "Rawlings and the Political Economy of Underdevelopment in Ghana." 
Oxford University Press 81 (1982). 
37 Ibid. 
38 Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. The Political Economy of Democratic 
Transitions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
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patronage still exists. The existence of patronage systems undermines democracy by 
fostering corruption and lowering accountability.39 Though Ghana, struggles with 
corruption it is not disproportionate to any other African country, meaning 
authoritarian enclaves were negligible. Thus all things considered transformation was 
favorable for Ghana. 
Conclusion 
Ghana is a country that has had a lot of factors work together positively in 
order to ensure its path toward a consolidated democracy. Most significant were the 
economic situation and the civil-military relations Rawlings took advantage of to 
ensure a gradual transition. This transition mimicked ones in Latin America, which 
were led by military and were pacted. This transition method has been identified as 
being most beneficial to democracy apparition.40 Although this mode also left 
authoritarian enclaves that Ghana is still fighting to correct,41 the gradual transition is 
stable and allows for democracy to emerge in an environment where ideological 
cleavages will define politics rather than domestic strife.42 In addition, Ghana’s 
peaceful geopolitical environment and relative ethnic homogeneity have fostered a 
more democratically conducive environment 
 
 
                                                        
39 Bratton, Michael, and De Walle, Nicolas Van. Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political 
Transitions in Africa. East Lansing, MI: Dept. of Political Science, Michigan State 
University, 1993. 
40
  Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 
41
 Jeffries, Richard. "Rawlings and the Poitical Economy of Underdevelopment in Ghana." 
Oxford University Press 81 (1982). 
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 See footnote 25 
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Chapter 2: The Bad 
Kenya was once a nation heralded for its democratic promise, with its stable 
economic growth and educated citizenry, boasting an impressive 85.1% literacy rate43, 
Kenya was seen as a country ripe for democracy. Noted African observer Joel Barkan 
even went so far as to proclaim in 2004: “ Along with Nigeria and South Africa, 
Kenya is one of the three ‘anchor’ states in Sub-Saharan Africa that is key to the 
stability of the region because of its location and resources. Egypt is the other anchor 
state in North Africa. As a result, Kenya has become the platform for U.S. operations 
in East Africa and the Horn.”44 Three years after this proclamation, however, Kenya 
would descend into mass ethnic violence as a result of disputed election results. This 
very issue personifies the problems with Kenya’s attempts at democracy, critically, 
poor leadership has occurred at crucial moments when consolidation was close at 
hand. Instead of constitutional reform leaders have fallen back on past discriminatory 
practices to the detriment of Kenya’s political development. However, despite this 
poor leadership Kenya still has many factors that are necessary for democracy and 
with more altruistic leadership the promise can become a reality. 
Political History 
 
Table 2.1 Kenyan Presidents 
President Political Party Time in office 
Jomo Kenyatta Kenyan African National Union 1963-1978 
Daniel Arap Moi KANU 1978-2002 
Murai Kibaki National Rainbow Coalition 2002-2008 
Murai Kibaki/ Raila 
Odinga 
Party of National Unity/ Orange 
Democratic Movement 
2008-Present 
 
                                                        
43
 Literacy data taken from CIA World Factbook 
44
 Barkan, Joel. “Kenya after Moi”. Foreign Affairs 83 (2004) 
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 Kenya is a former British colony, which achieved its independence in 1964. 
Revolts had been occurring throughout the colony from the early 1950’s typified by 
the Mau Mau emergency, which was a revolt aimed at the British rule but also as a 
way to assert ethnic dominance. The revolt led to brutal repression by the British with 
deplorable ‘screening camps’ devised in order to crush the rebellion’s spirit. 45 This 
treatment only spurred on more uprisings against British rule, however, there was 
never the presence of a unified national identity movement in the vein of gold coast 
nationalism in Ghana. Jomo Kenyatta who was head of the Kenyan African National 
Union (KANU) emerged as an independence leader, due to his combative and 
eloquent style, he then went on to become Kenya’s first president after the 1964 
election.  
His tenure in office was characterized by economic growth, ethnic patronage 
and tension and a border dispute with the Somali Democratic Republic. Kenyatta was 
a contradictory figure with his blatant preference for his Kikuyu ethnic group and the 
system of patronage hr began has left a persistent scar in Kenya’s political make up.46 
In fact, it is this very system that has seduced all future occupants of Kenya’s 
presidency. However, Kenyatta’s tenure was also vastly positive, after independence 
he managed to establish Kenya as a stable functioning state with solid economic 
growth.47 Using pro-Western practices and playing on the U.S fears of communism in 
order to receive aid Kenyatta was a shrewd politician. However the longer his rule 
lasted, the more he fell into autocratic practices. He amended the constitution to 
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increase his powers in 1966; and in 1969 he made Kenya a one party state. Kenyatta 
remained in power until he passed away in 1978 and power was then passed on to 
vice-president Daniel Arap Moi.  
 Moi continued Kenyatta’s ethnic patronage system, this time transferring 
power from the Kikuyu to his own ethnic group the Kalenjin, further aggravating 
ethnic cleavages. This aggravation of tensions resulted in two failed coup attempts in 
1982, by a group of soldiers from the Kenyan Air force. Moi responded by introducing 
a brutality and repression absent in the Kenyatta regime. He disbanded the Air Force, 
sentenced twelve people to death and jailed 900 more. The coup attempt pushed Moi 
into attempting to acquire more centralized power.48 However, frequent uprisings and 
foreign loan conditionality forced him into allowing multi-party elections. Eventually, 
the calls for change became too frequent for Moi to silence so he allowed for 
multiparty elections in 1992. The approval of multi-party elections came with a new 
constitution, which introduced term limits but failed to curb executive power any 
further. The election period was characterized by intimidation and wide scale usage of 
public resources by KANU, in this biased environment Moi easily won the elections. 
Moi repeated the same manipulative practices for the 1997 elections before stepping 
down due to the aforementioned term limits before the 2002 elections. However, his 
brutal legacy of neopatrimonial rule left a distinctly negative mark on Kenya’s 
political development.49 
 His successor in office Mwai Kibaki, although coming into power on a 
democratic mandate and decrying the autocratic regimes of Kenyatta and Moi, fell into 
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the same routine. His campaign promises aimed at shielding the fact that he was once 
a KANU member and decisively part of the ‘old guard’ viewed as holding Kenya 
back. Kibaki headed the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), an opposition union 
born out of necessity rather than pragmatism. This is evidenced by the NARC’s 
complete lack of unity upon Kibaki’s ascension into power.50 Kibaki similarly wasted 
no time in falling into old patronage practices, promptly placing his Kikuyu tribe back 
in a position of dominance. In addition, as there was no real reform of the constitution, 
one was attempted in 2005 but roundly rejected for not curbing enough executive 
power; manipulation of ethnic cleavages remained the only way to remain in power. 
Thus, corruption became rampant once again, with the John Githongo of the Office of 
Governance and Ethics publishing a particularly scathing indictment. Another 
liberalizing moment appeared with the 2007 elections, but Kibaki refused to heed the 
election results, manipulating poll results. Mass violence erupted killing more than 
1,500 people and displacing thousands more. Eventually, a power sharing accord was 
reached between Kibaki and opposition candidate Raila Odinga, however, the 
government has proven largely ineffective. 
Ethnic Composition 
 
In Kenya like most countries on the African continent there is a large amount 
of ethnic diversity. There is no disproportionately large ethnic group with the Kikuyu 
being marginally the largest at 22% closely followed by the Luhya at 14% and the Luo 
at 13%.51 This ethnic heterogeneity renders democratic transition much more complex. 
Indeed, there have been numerous ethnic clashes throughout Kenya’s history, which 
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reflect that tension. The Mau Mau revolution from 1952-56, although one primarily 
against British occupation, also related to the complex assertion of ethnicity.52 Similar 
ethnicity specific rebellions occurred throughout the country during colonization, 
which contrasts with the gold coast nationalism of Ghana, as these rebellions 
developed the idea of ethnic priority instead of national unity. This is not to say, 
however, that ethnic assertion is undemocratic that is hardly the case. What it does 
show is that there was the presence of some fractionalization before independence that 
would need to be addressed by post-independence governments. However, their 
manner of ‘dealing’ with the problem, creating patronage systems, has only 
exacerbated tensions making ethnicity an easily inflamed tinderbox evidenced by the 
mass violence that erupted post-2007 election.53 The violence was mainly between the 
Luo, ethnic group of opposition leader Odinga, and the Kikuyu, with the former 
unhappy at the latter’s preferential treatment.54 Tensions run so high that ethnic 
loyalties outweigh democratic process because the system is designed to benefit that 
allegiance rather than citizenry. Thus, the government needs to be willing to undertake 
a substantive rethink of their policies in regards to ethnicity in politics. Attempts such 
as an ethnic party ban attempted in 1993, which resulted in violence, have been few 
and far between. Until this issue of ethnic representation is sorted out Kenya will have 
enormous difficulty consolidating its democracy. 
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Geopolitical Environment 
Table 2.2 Kenya Geopolitical Environment 
Country FH Designation Ethnic War Revolutionary War Genocide 
Ethiopia Partly Free 1961-91, 1963-64, 
1977-78, 1999-00, 
2007-09 
1975-91 1976-79 
Somalia Not Free 1988-Present 1988-94 1988-91 
Sudan Not Free 1956-72, 1983-02, 
2003-Present 
No 1983-02, 
2003-09 
Tanzania Partly Free No No No 
Uganda Partly Free 1980-06 1983-85 1971-79, 
1980-86 
Source: Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2010, ICRG Political Risk Guide 
 
 Kenya’s geopolitical environment is vastly more complex than Ghana’s as is 
evidenced by the above table. Unlike Ghana, which had no neighboring countries that 
have experienced domestic unrest, all of Kenya’s neighbors with the exception of 
Tanzania have had some sort of experience with each of ethnic war, revolutionary war 
and Genocide. This sort of conflict ridden geopolitical environment is significant as 
Huntington points out as it can inspire regional instability, which causes problems for 
democratization.55 In addition, Kenya was engaged in border disputes with Somalia 
from 1963-1966, having these sorts of disputes is detrimental to chances for 
democracy. Phillipe Schmitter, when making his reflections on 25 years since the third 
wave began asserted: “Of all the economic and cultural prerequisites or preconditions 
of democracy, the one that must command the most urgent attention is the need for 
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prior agreement on national identity and borders.”56. This was not present in Kenya, 
however, though Kenya’s neighbors have been conflict ridden that has not resulted in 
too much instability for the country as problems have been relegated to their own 
borders. 
Civil-Military 
 
 Kenya has a highly professional military that is clearly delineated in the 
Kenyan constitution and has generally been supportive of the chief executive. 
Although there were the attempted coups against Daniel Moi, the military has largely 
been a non-factor in Kenyan politics taking a non-partisan view to political 
eventualities.57 
Conclusion 
 
Unfortunately for Kenyans poor leadership has emerged in the country at every true 
opening for democracy and it has dragged down the countries hopes for consolidation. 
Constitutional reform is in dire need as the current system has too much power 
concentrated in the executive. Without this reform, Kenya will likely see a repeat of 
the same pattern of ethnic patronage erupting into ethnic clashes. However, once this 
reform is achieved it is clear with Kenya’s advanced economy, educated citizenry and 
geopolitical influence it has all the ingredients for a successful democracy and 
influential regional power. The trajectory of the current power sharing government is 
extremely uncertain; their lack of action up until now has led to resentment and the 
fostering of lingering tension from 2007. A new constitution has been proposed but its 
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amendment will still take significant time, hence, there will be yet another chapter to 
come in Kenya’s democratic story, hopefully that one has a new ending. 
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Chapter 3: The Ugly 
 
The DRC is one of Africa’s most troubled nations, having a brutal legacy of 
violence that dates back to Belgian colonization. The DRC has been subject to conflict 
ever since its independence. It was the site of a brutal seven nation war named 
Africa’s world war, which was responsible for nearly 1000 deaths a day. It’s large 
mineral resource wealth, which was heralded upon independence, as a medium for 
growth has instead been a boon. The DRC has become the very embodiment of what 
Richard Auty termed the “resource curse.”58 Instead of providing growth their mineral 
wealth has fueled a devastating conflict. It is hard to imagine a more difficult 
environment for democracy to develop but it has begun. 
Political History 
Table 3.1 DRC Presidents 
President Political Party Time in office 
Joseph Kasa-Vubu ABAKO 1960-1965 
Mobutu Sese Seko Popular Movement of the Revolution 1965-1997 
Laurent Kabila Alliance of Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Congo-Zaire 
1997-2001 
Joseph Kabila People's Party for Reconstruction and 
Democracy 
2001-Present 
 
The DRC achieved its independence in 1960, due in part to nationalist riots held, 
throughout the country and particularly in Kinshasa. Joseph Kasa-Vubu of ABAKO 
was elected president and Patrice Lumumba his prime minister. The riots were, as in 
Kenya, born from ethnic loyalties and not necessarily from a larger national 
identification.59 This is evidenced in the fact that very shortly after independence and 
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elections the army mutinied and the country essentially split into four quasi-
independent states. Ensuring the tenure of Kasa-Vubu was largely innocuous.  
With the large-scale unrest, that typified the period between 1960-65, Col. Joseph 
Mobutu head of the armed forces assumed power and dismissed the government. He 
was able through international financing to launch an attack against the separatist 
Katanga province. Finally in 1963 unity was achieved with all provinces becoming a 
part of the republic. Mobutu remodeled himself as Mobutu Sese Soko assumed the 
presidency and began a campaign of African authenticity, which entailed changing 
city names and nationalizing industries this culminated in the renaming of the country 
to Zaire.60 Mobutu ran a totalitarian neopatrimonial regime, maintaining all power 
within the executive. He did little if nothing to develop any institutions in the country 
deciding instead to build his personal wealth, accruing an estimated $4 billion 
fortune.61  
Conflict was omnipresent from independence with foreign involvement needed in 
1977 and 1978. Despite independence attempts in the Shaba region and other ethnic 
conflicts Mobutu was still able to hold tentative control of government at least until 
the Rwandan genocide of 1994. With his health failing and a large number of 
Rwandan refugees and combatants spilling into the border Mobutu’s end was near. 
Laurent Kabila head of ADFLC backed by the Rwandan Tutsi rebels overthrew 
Mobutu in 1996. In 1997 they gained full control of government, changing the country 
name back to Congo.  
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However, in 1998 Rwandan and Ugandan forces were able to take control of parts 
of the DRC claiming territorial disputes but instead seeking mineral wealth.62 Kabila 
fought back and was aided by Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops. In 2001, 
though Kabila was assassinated prompting his son Joseph Kabila to rise into power. 
Joseph Kabila was quicker to engage the other rebels and initiated peace talks, which 
culminated in the signing of the Sun City Agreement in 2003, which effectively ended 
the war, though sporadic fighting ensues.63  
In 2005 a new constitution was approved and in 2006 elections were held with 
Kabila declared the winner, in what was largely a fair campaign. Though he was 
initially heralded for his peace efforts, democratic prognosis has slipped since his 
dismissal of his main opposition Jean-Pierre Demba. 
Ethnic Composition 
 
The DRC is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Africa with four groups 
tied at 11.4% as the largest group.64 The Belgian colonial legacy was harsh on the 
country with their brand of administration bolstering tensions between indigenous 
groups. The strong independence movements of the provinces persist from when the 
country became a republic. This shows that there are identity issues that stretch to the 
inception of the country and in such a situation reconciliation becomes extremely 
difficult. The Mobutu administration greatly ignored the issue of fractionalization 
resorting to autocratic tactics of repression to retain control. This encouraged ethnic 
differences and when such cleavages are omnipresent they create a political 
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atmosphere characterized by tension and uncertainty.65 Such is the fractionalization of 
society in the DRC that ethnic cleavages have become its defining characteristic. 
Geopolitical Environment 
Table 3.1 DRC Geopolitical Environments 
Country FH Designation Ethnic War Revolutionary War Genocide 
Angola Not Free 1975-02 1975-02 1975-94, 
1998-02 
Burundi  Partly Free 1972,1988-05 No 1965-73, 
1988, 1993 
Central African 
Republic 
Partly Free 2005-Present No No 
Rep. of Congo  Not Free No 1997-99 No 
Rwanda  Not Free 1990-98, 2001 No 1963-64, 
1994 
Sudan Not Free 1956-72, 1983-
02, 2003-
Present 
No 1983-02, 
2003-09 
Tanzania Partly Free No No No 
Uganda Partly Free 1980-06 1983-85 1971-79, 
1980-86 
Zambia Partly Free No 1964 No 
Source: Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2010, ICRG Political Risk Guide 
 
Like Kenya the DRC also inhabits a troubled geopolitical space, however, unlike 
Kenya the DRC has been involved in external conflict with its neighbors. The 
distinction of national boundaries is soundly superficial in the DRC. With all the 
incursions into its territory by neighbors there has been no ability to have “agreement” 
on national boundaries as Schmitter suggests. This fact has only led to the fostering of 
conflict. As one can see from table 3.1, most of the DRC’s neighbors have 
experienced some large-scale internal strife. These conflicts have leaked into the 
country reflecting the interconnected nature of the vast array of ethnic groups in the 
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region. There is also the evidence of mercenary activity by many of these nations as 
they mask profiteering activities with ethnic violence. In addition, as proven by 
Caprioli and Trumbore, countries that experience large-scale internal ethnic conflict 
are more likely to conduct intra-state conflict.66 With this lack of geopolitical stability 
the DRC has failed to be able to have any ability to focus on internal political 
development, as external conflict becomes priority. 
Civil-Military 
 
There are really no civil military relations to speak of as the DRC is essentially 
divided into a number of factionalized regional militias. They dominate political life 
with parties forming along faction lines. This sort of existence reinforces itself in that 
violence becomes a person’s only option for political mobility. O’Donnell and 
Schmitter identified this effect and it has had devastating affects on the DRC.67 With 
rampant militancy state authority has been extremely weak rendering it unable to 
complete essential services. The militant characteristic of the DRC has destroyed the 
political space, leaving a zero-sum winner take all situation.  
Transition Dynamics 
 
 Applying structured contingent choice to the DRC we see that the transition t 
democracy has occurred in a revolutionary setting with the president being 
assassinated. The transition is seemingly elite led but with all the fractionalization in 
Congolese political space too much uncertainty for one actor to take the lead. The 
transition included constitution reform, which was an important step, but as it was 
                                                        
66
 Caprioli, M. and P. F. Trumbore. "Ethnic Discrimination and Interstate Violence: Testing 
the International Impact of Domestic Behavior." Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 1. 
67
 O'Donnell, Guillermo A., Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986. 
 33
done in a conflict setting there are extreme doubts on its longevity. This transition can 
definitely be viewed moreover as replacement because though the government started 
the process they have little to no negotiating power making the transition extremely 
contentious. The result of this transition has been a weak government with an 
incredibly small sphere of influence. 
Conclusion 
 
The DRC’s issues are too numerous to recount with significant issues arising 
from all the key variables, what this indicates is that the DRC’s transition to 
democracy is far from inevitable. The Sun City agreement of 2003 went a long way to 
ensuring peace but with fighting still occurring around the Congolese borders progress 
will be difficult. Thus, unless the external conflict is solved democracy will not arise. 
In addition, at the next opportunity decentralization of power to regional authorities 
must be attempted. More regional autonomy could help ease the tensions and with 
reform on party conditions this could aid the process. What the DRC case shows as 
well is the power of leadership; even though the transition is extremely tense it shows 
hat if there is leaders willing to put aside difference can make progress. Joseph Kabila 
has already gone back on that promise upon expelling his main political rival but the 
point remains that altruism in leadership can have positive benefits beyond other 
measures. 
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Conclusion 
  
 This paper has shown three diverging forms of democratization on the African 
continent. We had the example of Ghana, a success built from a gradual transition 
process and favorable domestic and geopolitical environment. Ghana is one of 
Africa’s leading democracies and its future seems very bright. More work still needs 
to be done there especially in terms of curbing corruption but the progress it has 
achieved thus far is remarkable. 
 Kenya was the ambivalent case, a country that always seems on the cusp of 
democratizing but is foiled usually by some combination of poor leadership and ethnic 
tension. Kenya’s future, like its status, is uncertain: if constitutional reform is achieved 
and some form of decentralization happens then the future is bright for democracy in 
the country, but without reform the country is doomed to repeat the same mistakes. 
 The DRC was the case of failure; a nation seemingly trapped in an endless 
conflict. Hope for democracy has always been extremely dim in regards to the DRC. 
However, in 2006 they initiated their first free and fair elections. Though the state 
remains limited to a small sphere of influence and is weak, this is a positive advance. 
There are significant domestic and foreign challenges to the consolidation of 
democracy in the country, given those challenges, the chances of democratic 
consolidation are limited. For a transition to democracy to occur the external conflicts 
first need to be resolved. Multi-lateral talks have been initiated toward this end but 
whether they are fruitful or not remains to be seen. The current regime needs to begin 
some decentralization as the provinces would benefit from increased revenue and this 
could ease conflict. 
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 So what do these cases say about democracy in general in the Sub-Saharan 
continent and its prospects? What they say about democracy on the continent is that 
there is hope for its incarnation no matter the difficulty of situation. The DRC case 
proves that even in the most conflict and fractionalized societies on the continent the 
democratic process is growing. The trend of democratization is expected to, in general, 
increase around the continent; with the idea of good governance continually gaining 
traction especially within the African Union contagion could take affect.  
 The most significant challenge to democratization on the continent and one 
that does not have a clear solution is the problem of leadership. This issue is best 
characterized with the case of Kenya, where openings have been spurned due to poor 
leadership. The DRC under Kabila also seems to be making a shift from the promise 
of the Sun City Agreement and engaging cooperation, to autocratic practices with the 
expulsion of opposition leadership.  
Ghana’s success could be attributed as much to its favorable conditions as it 
could to Rawlings’ perception of the “liberalizing opportunity” and his pursuit of a 
gradual transition. This is in contrast to Kenya, where independence leader Kenyatta 
and his successor Moi both faced a similar liberalizing opportunity with large 
economic growth occurring at some stage of their tenures. However, instead of taking 
that opportunity both further consolidated their power and entrenched systems that 
have been to the detriment of Kenya’s social cohesion. There is no doubt that had 
Mobutu Sese Soku faced economic growth he too would have spurned the opportunity 
and his estimated $4 billion stolen fortune is evidence of this assertion.68  
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This indictment may seem simplistic but it is true no matter what favorable 
socioeconomic conditions a country enjoys, without effective leadership willing to 
advance democracy it will not occur. So as simple as it may seem its consequences are 
vast. This can be evidenced throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, with the contrast of 
Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe a pertinent example. Both were revolutionary 
heroes, with international acclaim and enormous domestic support heading countries 
coming from what Huntington termed a Racial Oligarchy; that is a system where a 
racial minority rules over a majority.69 The similarities end there though, while one 
has been heralded for their altruism the other has been decried for his lack thereof. The 
fate of their respective countries reflects the power of leadership, where South Africa 
is now a continental pace setter, as opposed to Zimbabwe, which is a pariah. It bears to 
mention that upon Robert Mugabe’s ascension to power Zimbabwe was considered 
Africa’s breadbasket, enjoying strong economic growth. It is now Africa’s joke 
recently abandoning its currency after inflation reached uncontrollable levels.70 
Therefore, until selfless and responsible leadership emerges that is able to 
place societal good above personal gain Africa will struggle to democratize. However, 
as evidenced by the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya there is a new generation 
of African’s who have had enough of the ‘Big Men’ from the past. Only time will tell 
if this new generation can avoid the mistakes of the past but there is hope. 
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